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 Summary 
Welfare State Reform Over the Very Long Run 
New data makes it possible to measure the evolution of social program generosity over 
the roughly three decades since the affluent democracies entered the “era of austerity.” 
Compared with plausible expectations derived from power resource theory, as well as 
prior historical experience, these data reveal a striking level of stability in benefits. This 
finding has important implications for the study of the welfare state; rather than 
focusing exclusively on accounting for variation in program outcomes over time and 
across countries, we need to consider why there is often relatively little variation to 
explain. At the same time, this relative stability at the level of programs co-exists with 
dramatic change in social context as well dramatic shifts in other aspects of the post-war 
social contract. The ramifications of programmatic stability can only be understood by 
situating it within these broader patterns of social transformation. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Neue Daten ermöglichen uns heute die Messung, wie sich die Generosität von 
Sozialleistungen in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten entwickelt hat – also in jener Phase, in 
der die reichen Demokratien in das “Zeitalter der Austerität” eingetreten sind. Im 
Vergleich zu den Erwartungen der Machtressourcen-Theorie und zu historischen 
Erfahrungen zeigen die Daten eine bemerkenswerte Stabilität im Hinblick auf die Höhe 
der Sozialleistungen. Dieser Befund besitzt erhebliche Implikationen für die 
Sozialstaatsforschung. Diese sollte sich nicht mehr nur auf die Erklärung der 
Unterschiede von Outcomes im Zeitverlauf und zwischen Ländern beschränken, 
sondern auch die Frage stellen, weshalb oftmals die zu erklärenden Unterschiede so 
gering sind. Gleichzeitig geht die Stabilität der Sozialleistungen Hand in Hand mit 
dramatischen Veränderungen im gesellschaftlichen Umfeld und tiefgreifenden 
Umwälzungen in der Nachkriegsordnung. Die Konsequenzen dieser Stabilität verstehen 
wir nur dann, wenn wir sie als Teil einer umfassenden sozialen Transformation 
begreifen. 
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“Macrosociology has to be a sociology of the long pull” 
Arthur Stinchcombe (1997, p. 406). 
The “era of austerity” is now almost four decades old.1 It has lasted longer than the 
“golden age” itself. Most citizens have now been living with conditions of austerity or 
“welfare state maturation” for their entire adult lives. After such a long (and still incom-
plete) journey through very troubled waters, it is a reasonable time to take stock of the 
welfare state’s status. 
For analysts, this offers a double opportunity. Research on the distinctive dynamics of 
mature welfare states has now had considerable time to develop. As the publication of the 
Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State magnificently demonstrates, the long-term pursuit 
of an extensive “research program” on the determinants of social policy has yielded a 
fabulous harvest (Castles et al 2010). Compared to, say, 1981 (when I began my doctoral 
research at Yale), we know vastly more about the welfare state. We have far, far better 
cross-national data. Moreover, the data we have are much more closely connected to key 
concepts. And those concepts have grown more subtle and sophisticated, as fruitful theo-
retical dialogue has generated more extensive and careful elaboration of the relevant di-
mensions of the social world. There has also been a huge proliferation of rich qualitative, 
country-based studies that generate understanding through their greater capacity to study 
actual processes of social conflict, along with the motivations and behavior of crucial 
political actors. Anyone who doubts the capacity of social research to accumulate over 
time need only study this literature (Amenta 2003). 
The second opportunity comes from the passage of so much time. I have argued else-
where that a characteristic blind-spot of modern social science is a tendency to focus ex-
clusively on “snapshots” of a single moment in time (Pierson 2004). We are typically far 
better at studying social phenomena that emerge quickly and directly than ones that 
emerge slowly and indirectly. Social outcomes that take decades to emerge often remain 
invisible, or falsely attributed to short-term factors. Here we have the opportunity to 
study the longue durree, the development of important social phenomena over a period 
stretching almost four decades. 
In short, we are now in a good position to take a step back and analyze the “era of auster-
ity” over the very long run. 
                                                 
1  Following most analysts, I date the end of the “golden era” to 1973. This periodization builds on 
the perceived link between growing economic difficulties and a harsher climate for the welfare 
state. Higher unemployment and slower growth generate fiscal pressure, and mounting calls for 
austerity. 
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Putting FourDecades in Perspective 
Before examining what the evidence shows, I want to spend a bit of time thinking 
through what our expectations should be. What should we expect to find when we look at 
social policy development over such a long and turbulent period? The case I want to 
make is that there are many reasons we should expect to see a lot of change, and mostly 
in a particular direction. 
One way to frame our expectations is to juxtapose the most recent period with the 
changes that occurred during the period that preceded it – let’s say from roughly 1940 to 
1975 (although one can argue that an even shorter stretch, from 1945-1973, is the appro-
priate periodization). If we examine this stretch, of course, what we see are huge changes 
in social policy on multiple dimensions. In 1940, the welfare states of most industrial 
democracies looked decidedly modest by modern standards. As Alex Hicks documents, 
of the fifteen countries he considers only four had reached the basic stage of “consolida-
tion” with “binding and extensive” policies covering the core social insurance programs 
(Hicks 1999, p. 51).  
 
Source: Hicks 1999. 
By the end of the Golden Age, of course, it was a very different story. Excepting the 
United States, all of these welfare states had consolidated. Moreover, all of them, includ-
ing the United States, had vastly increased both the generosity and coverage of their core 
social programs. Hicks contrasts 1950 and 1980. Consider some representative examples. 
In the UK, pension replacement rates jumped from 28% in 1950 to 50% in 1980. In the 
United States, they jumped from 39% to 67%. In Sweden, from 27% to 89%. In Italy, 
from 18% to 75%. Countries also greatly expanded their coverage rates, which were in 
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most cases quite spotty in the 1940s. Some basic summary information is offered in Ta-
ble 1. 
For citizens who had previously grappled with persistent economic insecurity, it marked 
a stunning transformation. To offer one stark example, in the 1950s, very few in the 
United States were able to retire voluntarily – over 90% in surveys reported that they had 
“retired” because of ill health or because they had been laid off. By the 1980s, the over-
whelming majority of retirees reported that their separation from work was voluntary 
(Esping-Andersen 2009, p. 148). What happened to welfare states over the course of this 
generation was nothing short of revolutionary. 
The World Since 1975 
A second way to establish expectations about the fate of the welfare state during the era 
of austerity would be to look sideways, so to speak, rather than backwards. That is, it is 
useful to remind ourselves of the scale of social change that has occurred in the world of 
affluent democracies over the past few decades. All long eras are marked by social turbu-
lence, and of course this most recent period is no exception. Limiting ourselves for a 
moment to some of the dimensions of social life most related to economic and social pol-
icy we might note some of the following areas of dramatic shifts in affluent societies. All 
of this is well known so I will pass over it relatively quickly. Yet this cursory review un-
derscores a critical point: the social world of 2010 is a vastly different place than that of 
the mid-1970s. 
A good place to begin is the fact that forty years ago it was common to say “industrial 
societies” while now the label “post-industrial” is more likely to be invoked (Daniel 
Bell’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society being published in 1973). One reason 1973 
is often treated as a turning point is that the rising unemployment rates of the era were 
associated with the acceleration of a long-term decline in manufacturing employment 
throughout the OECD. In the decades that followed, economic structures changed dra-
matically. Employment shifted from manufacturing to services, a change in many ways 
as wrenching as the earlier employment shift from agriculture to manufacturing. The shift 
was associated with wages and job structures that often meshed less than perfectly with 
existing social program designs. Economies became more open as well, as trade and capi-
tal mobility increased rapidly – often causing massive disruption in long-standing social 
arrangements as they did so.2 
Changes in family life were equally dramatic. There was a huge influx of women into the 
paid labor force. Divorce became much more common, as did births outside of marriage 
                                                 
2  For a gripping discussion of one aspect of this “creative destruction” see The Box, Mark Levin-
son’s analysis of the causes and consequences of the containerization revolution (Levinson 2006). 
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in many societies. With these developments came large increases in the prevalence of 
single-parent households. Nor were these the only demographic changes. Fertility rates 
fell sharply in most affluent democracies – in the case of Southern Europe, astonishingly, 
they were cut in half. At the other end of the age spectrum came equally astounding in-
creases in longevity. As we all know, the result of these two trends was a slow and steady 
but ultimately transformative shift in the age profiles of post-industrial societies.  
Rising immigration has been another source of dramatic social change. Many ethnically 
homogeneous societies became much more diverse and were forced to grapple with new 
social pressures and conflicts. Already diverse societies like the United States became 
dramatically more so. 
Politics, as well, has undergone some fundamental changes. Typically, social researchers 
treat political institutions as fixed features of the social environment, as they are usually 
some of the most durable elements of our social arrangements. They do, however, occa-
sionally undergo significant changes, and the consequences of changes in institutional 
arrangements for social provision may be quite substantial over the long-run.3 
Here, too, the early 21st century looks very different from the 1970s. Far and away the 
most important change in institutional arrangements over the past few decades has been 
the remarkable expansion of the EU. Welfare states have been, and largely remain, na-
tional. Now, however, they are embedded in a complex multi-level system of governance. 
This is only the most cursory and partial review. It should suffice, however, to drive 
home the main point. The last generation has witnessed dramatic social, economic and 
political changes. On multiple dimensions, the affluent democracies of 2010 were quite 
different societies than the ones of 1970. 
Pressures on the Welfare State since the “Golden Age” 
I have offered an intentionally broad sketch of long-term social changes, both during the 
“golden age” and the decades that followed. The sketch is designed to establish a simple 
idea: over a period of three or four decades societies should be expected to change a lot. 
Now I want to focus a little bit more on a series of factors that generate particularly acute 
pressures on the welfare state itself. Perhaps the most publicized is population ageing. In 
all affluent democracies, social provision (both pensions and health care) is weighted 
towards the elderly – in many countries dramatically so (Lynch 2006). Thus a consider-
                                                 
3  Indeed, Iversen and Soskice (2006) have recently argued that institutional arrangements – specifi-
cally the choice of majoritarian or proportional representation rules – are the most critical feature 
in determining long-term patterns of social provision. 
 
9 
able source of pressure on the welfare state has been the shifting demographic profile of 
affluent democracies, generated by both declining fertility and lengthening life-spans.  
In addition, a major strand of recent research on the welfare state, most closely associated 
with the remarkable work of Gosta Esping-Andersen, has stressed the emergence of “new 
risks” associated with the changing composition of societies and changing patterns of 
employment (Esping-Andersen 1999; 2009; Bonoli 2007). Among these new risks are 
those associated with the increasing prevalence of single-parent households, the long-
term economic risks incurred when child-rearing is associated with absence from the la-
bor market, and the increasing prevalence of part-time or precarious employment. They 
represent challenges that were less significant, or at least less politically salient, during 
the early development of welfare states. 
As Esping-Andersen, Bonoli and others have argued, all of these emerging or newly-
salient risks create potential demand for public expenditure. They are, in this sense, com-
petitors for scarce resources with already-established social programs. Indeed, a number 
of prominent recent analyses of social policy have placed special emphasis on this clash 
between the “old” welfare state (in some cases almost literally a welfare state for the old) 
and the “new” welfare state seeking room to expand (Lynch 2006; Hausermann 2010). 
My point is simply that these emergent trends, like population ageing, place pressure on 
established social programs.  
I have left until last what is probably the single most salient transformation of all, which 
is the substantial shift in “power resources” throughout the OECD from organized labor 
to employers. A central theme in the literature on the development of the welfare state is 
the role of the organized political left, including both labor unions and affiliated political 
parties. This theme has been around for a long time. It has, however, continued to gener-
ate a steady stream of research as the scholarly conversation has moved forward in the 
past few decades. Researchers have sought and found better data, as well as explored the 
various interconnections between left “power resources” and a host of potentially impor-
tant variables (e.g. the structure and role of employers and left parties, the role of reli-
gious cleavages and confessional parties, and the relevance of political institutional vari-
ables such as the structure of veto points, federalism, and electoral rules). 
Summarizing such a vast literature is daunting and subject to numerous caveats. Yet it is 
difficult to read this body of increasingly sophisticated work without coming away con-
vinced that the core propositions of power resources theory have withstood various chal-
lenges quite well (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2006). There have been many valu-
able extensions, qualifications, or nuances added to the original argument. Christian De-
mocracy has made crucial contributions to welfare state expansion, especially when it has 
been in competition with strong parties of the left (Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). 
Important segments of the business community have found important benefits in systems 
of social provision, and have often accommodated themselves to expansions of the wel-
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fare state -- when they have been forced to do so (Mares 2003; Swenson 2002; cf. Hacker 
and Pierson 2002 and Korpi 2006). Rules governing political contestation matter, with 
federalism generally constituting difficult terrain for building extensive and generous 
welfare states (Obinger, Leibfried and Castles 2005) while voting based on proportional 
representation has been a favorable condition (Iversen and Soskice 2006). 
Nuances and qualifications aside, the central claim – that the organized capacity of un-
ions and parties associated with working and middle income groups has a huge impact on 
the degree and character of welfare state expansion – is robust. This finding provides a 
principal catalyst for the current discussion. Indeed, for me a central question has always 
been: what does the fate of the welfare state in the long era of austerity tells us about the 
continuing application of this well-established argument? I will have more to say about 
this later on. At this juncture, I wish only to highlight the implications for our expecta-
tions. For the long-term trends related to the capacity of organized labor have clearly 
been bleak. As Figure 1 indicates, average union density in the OECD nations peaked at 
34% in 1975 – a revealing year – and has fallen inexorably since then. By 2008, average 
density was below 18%, although of course there is enormous variation across countries. 
This represents a very large shift in the balance of organizational capacity. Arguably, it 
understates the degree of change. Where bargaining power has shifted to employers, un-
ions may hang on organizationally even as they are forced to concede substantive ground 
on issues. 
  
Source: OECD 
What would we expect the effect of such a substantial shift in the balance of power re-
sources to be? Here, the recent comments of Walter Korpi (2006, p. 187), a principal ar-
chitect of the theory, are explicit:  
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Major shifts in the relative disadvantage of labor – responding to factors affecting posi-
tions of capital as well as of labor – are likely to be reflected in movements on the left-
right continuum of the set of feasible alternatives around which political conflict is cen-
tered at a particular time. 
In other words, the “feasible alternatives” in policy disputes should be moving rightward, 
towards a rollback of gains achieved when labor was stronger. 
So as we prepare to examine the actual empirical record, I want to suggest what our ex-
pectations ought to be: we should expect that nearly four decades of social turbulence and 
growing sources of pressure will have left a deep mark on systems of social provision. 
There have been dramatic changes in social needs and social structure, unfavorable shifts 
in the design of political institutions, increasingly intense competition over scarce fiscal 
resources, and a considerable decline in the political clout of the organizations that have 
been the welfare state’s greatest supporters. Fast-forwarding a generation from the 1970s, 
armed with this information, would it be a shock to discover (as someone fast-forwarded 
a generation from 1940 would have) welfare states that were practically unrecognizable? 
I don’t think so. 
Retrenchment Revisited 
The discussion of what has happened to the welfare state since the end of the Golden Age 
has been intense, and it has had some peculiar qualities. As I have already suggested, we 
know a lot more than we used to know. There have been exceptional studies of the ex-
periences of individual countries or particular clusters of countries (Hausermann 2010; 
Palier 2010). Other scholars have focused fruitfully on the distinctive dynamics associ-
ated with particular policy areas, like pensions (Bonoli 2000, Weaver 2010). There have 
been impressive theoretical works that give us new ways of thinking about long-term 
social policy development, such as Bruno Palier’s analysis of how small scale changes 
can sometimes give rise to larger ones (Palier 2005) or Jacob Hacker’s propositions about 
how large changes might be occurring in ways that typically escape our notice and high-
light distinct political dynamics (Hacker 2004b). At the same time, quantitative analyses 
have sought to bring the arguments and methodological approaches that have so fruitfully 
explored the era of expansion to the more recent era of austerity (Huber and Stephens 
2001; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004).  
None of these efforts, however, really wrestle effectively with what I would argue is the 
single most pressing question for those who, as I do, see the emergence of systems of 
modern social provision as a development of world-historical significance. When we look 
at the world of established welfare states in affluent democracies, how much change has 
there been? More specifically, given what we might expect under the circumstances out-
lined earlier in this paper, has there been a substantial curtailment of the efforts intro-
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duced over the preceding decades? This was the question that framed my own investiga-
tions almost a quarter-century ago. I’m slightly surprised to find that we still don’t seem 
to have especially solid answers. 
I would argue that this failure reflects distinctive biases typical in the qualitative and 
quantitative literatures on welfare state change. In the qualitative literature, the essential 
problem is a form of selection bias. Scholars don’t randomly select their cases of social 
policy development. Rather, the scholarly incentives promote hunting for social policy 
change and then explicating it. Uncovering stasis, the equivalent of the statistical finding 
of no effect, is pretty dull. It is an empirical result that can be enormously revealing, but 
generally doesn’t provide the basis for publishing an article. It becomes even more tedi-
ous once someone else has made that basic claim. In short, finding no or limited change 
is a dog-bites-man story.  
This bias, I’ve already suggested, has generated some great work. It doesn’t, however, 
allow us to answer the central question. 
Quantitative research has a different bias. It is most typically preoccupied with the expla-
nation of whatever variation it finds across cases – why more change in Country X than 
Country Y? Or what factors best explain the differences between outcomes at time 1 and 
time 2? These are important questions, and I’ll return to them. But if we are trying to look 
at the big historical picture, it really should follow a prior question: how much change is 
there to explain? 
The “how much change” question is often dismissed as “merely descriptive.” It is indeed 
descriptive, but not “merely” so, because the answers we give are theoretically telling 
ones. Although the matter is often left implicit, different theories have, or should have, 
different expectations about whether we should anticipate large or small effects from par-
ticular changes in social circumstances over time.  
The good news is that we are in a much stronger position to address this “merely descrip-
tive” question than we were a decade ago. The enhanced prospects reflect not only the 
passage of more time but also the compilation of new, more appropriate data. This devel-
opment is due to the impressive labor of individual scholars, but it is worth noting that it 
also reflects the way a vibrant intellectual discussion creates incentives to push the con-
versation forward. 
Almost all analysts of welfare state retrenchment have long agreed that spending is a 
poor proxy for measuring the generosity of welfare states, typically invoking Esping-
Andersen’s comment that no one fights over spending per se. Spending levels are easy to 
count and compare, but they are influenced by many factors other than the generosity of 
programs. What we really want to know – or at least the first thing we want to know – is 
what is happening to the programs.  
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Qualitative research on retrenchment has always focused on program outcomes.4 How-
ever, there are of course huge constraints on our ability to draw broad conclusions from 
the study of a few countries or a limited number of programs. Fortunately, researchers 
have now pursued extensive projects to develop comparable data on program outcomes – 
replacement rates and coverage -- over long stretches of time and many countries. Path-
breaking in this regard was work on the Social Citizenship Indicators Program directed 
by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme. Yet the data associated with this project was until 
quite recently only available as presented in published papers, limited (again, until re-
cently) to a very partial selection of social programs and only at five-year intervals. 
Scruggs (nd), however, has pursued a similar project, developing annual data covering 18 
countries from 1971 to 2002. The data cover replacement rates, coverage, and additional 
features of benefit generosity such as waiting days. The Scruggs data archive, accessible 
to all researchers, creates an unprecedented capacity for any researcher to track annual 
program evolution for many countries over long time periods extending into the recent 
past. 
The following three figures summarize important elements of the Scruggs data. They 
show family or couple replacement rates, for three programs – sickness, unemployment 
benefit, and pensions. For each program, the figure shows movement in the mean re-
placement rate over time for each of three clusters of countries: “liberal”, “conservative”, 
and “social democratic.” 
  
Source: Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Data Set 
                                                 
4  In this respect, Allan and Scrugg’s (2004) criticism of me for relying on spending data in assessing 
retrenchment is unfair. I discussed the limits of these figures at length, and relied primarily on the 
evaluation of programmatic outcomes in reaching conclusions regarding the extent of retrench-
ment. Their critique seems to be based on the assumption that only numbers count as evidence. 
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Source: Scruggs Data Set 
 
Source: Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Data Set 
Having thought about these issues for more than twenty years, I’m fascinated by these 
figures. The results are striking – even if they have a slightly dog-bites-man quality. Re-
placement rates typically peak in 1980 or later. Of the nine “cluster means”, only one 
(Social Democratic unemployment) is at its highest in 1971. Three cluster means peak 
around 1980, three in 1990 and one is at its highest in 2002. In seven of nine cases, clus-
ter means are higher in 2002 than they were in 1971 – often significantly higher. In one 
case they are tied. Again, only in one case (Social Democratic Unemployment Benefit) is 
the cluster mean lower than it was towards the end of the “golden age.” 
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Another way to look at this (following the approach of Korpi and Palme) is to focus on 
the decline from the peak, whenever that peak occurs. This approach, of course creates a 
frame that provides the greatest likelihood of finding retrenchment. A country that saw 
steadily higher replacement rates for thirty years, followed by a single year of decline, 
would be coded as a case of retrenchment. Looked at this way, eight of nine cluster medi-
ans have declined from their peak values. Five of them, however, are declines of 3% or 
less (e.g. the mean pension replacement rate for couples in the conservative cluster falls 
from its 1990 peak of 69% to 66% in 2002). The single biggest drop among the other 
three is the fall in sickness benefits in the liberal cluster, where the mean replacement rate 
declines from its peak of 58% around 1980 to 52% in 2002. 
Now, whether that is a big drop or not is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. This is 
why I began this discussion with an extensive effort to consider what our expectations for 
change might be. Taking into account what we know about change in social provision 
during other historical periods, changes over the past generation in other dimensions of 
the social world, and theoretical arguments about how those changes ought to be related 
to changes in the welfare state, what should we expect to observe? Given acute demo-
graphic and economic pressures over a period of more than three decades, along with a 
broad decline in the power resources of organized labor, I think most analysts would have 
expected more cases of big drops. 
We need to dig further, however. “Cluster means” of course, can hide important informa-
tion about particular countries – perhaps the means are staying relatively stable because 
retrenchment in some cases is being offset by expansions in other countries. If we move 
to the examination of individual countries, we can see that there is something to this ob-
jection. Looking at changes in the eighteen individual countries for the three policy areas 
gives us 54 trends to examine. What if we ask: in how many cases is there a fall from the 
peak of 10% or more – e.g., from 50% to 40%?5 The answer is that we see declines on 
that scale in thirteen of our fifty-four programs: three pension systems (Belgium, France 
and Germany); six sickness benefit systems (New Zealand, the UK, Denmark, The Neth-
erlands and Sweden) and five unemployment benefit systems (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK). 
As already noted, the Korpi/Palme test, which takes the highest replacement rate ever 
registered as a baseline, is highly sensitive to signs of retrenchment – arguably overly so. 
Consider a case like Irish pensions, where the replacement rate for couples rose from 
40% in 1971 to 49% in 1980, to 58% in 1990 before declining to 53% in 2002. Under the 
Korpi/Palme test this looks like significant retrenchment (though below the 10 point 
threshold I am using). And yet Irish pension benefits in 2002 were substantially more 
                                                 
5  This cut-off for a “large” retrenchment, like any, could be disputed. It also counts a reduction from 
85% to 75% the same as a cut from 20 to 10 – which biases the results to include more cases of 
programs that start with very high replacement rates.  
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generous than they were towards the end of the “golden age.” An alternative way to look 
at this would be to ask how many cases there are where programs offer replacement rates 
10% below the rates of the early 70s. Under this tougher test, just six out of 54 programs 
have experienced major retrenchment: one pension system (Germany), two sickness 
benefit systems (the UK and The Netherlands) and three unemployment benefit systems 
(the UK, Denmark, and The Netherlands).  
We need to dig a little deeper, putting this evidence concerning replacement rates in 
broader context. One important parameter to consider is program coverage – if there were 
significant shifts away from universalism, with access to benefits increasingly restricted, 
this would obviously constitute an important dimension of retrenchment even if replace-
ment rates were relatively stable. In general, however, the opposite appears to have been 
the case. As Scruggs (2007, p. 152) summarizes his own evaluation of the data, 
“[u]nemployment insurance coverage increased considerably during the 1960s and early 
1970s in most countries, and has gradually converged towards full coverage over time.” 
Switzerland and Belgium are the only cases of significant decline in sickness benefit cov-
erage. In the case of pensions, Scruggs offers the following summary: 
most of the countries considered here attained something approaching universal 
take-up, once social pensions, public pensions and civil service pensions are all 
considered. With a couple of exceptions – e.g. Australia moved towards and then 
away from making its state pension universal – pensions are more universal today 
than they were 30 or 40 years ago (Scruggs 2007, pp. 153-54, emphasis added).  
In short, when one looks at coverage rather than replacement rates the evidence of sub-
stantial retrenchment is even weaker. 
One way to move towards a general take on this flood of new data on the fate of welfare 
state programs is to look briefly at Scruggs’ important recent effort to summarize the im-
pact of changes in program generosity. Following the basic contours of Esping-
Andersen’s seminal work on decommodification, Scruggs has assembled a summary 
measure of program generosity over time in these three programs. His “benefit generosity 
index” includes not only replacement rates and coverage but also restrictions on program 
access (such as waiting days for sickness benefits and time limits for unemployment 
benefits).  
The cross-national results, again divided by cluster, are presented in Figure 5. To me they 
provide a pretty striking story of stability at the level of core programs. There is some 
erosion after the mid-1980s, but it is very modest. Note also that the three clusters remain 
very distinct, although there is a slight movement of the Social Democratic cluster back 
towards the other clusters (a shift that seems to largely reflect reductions in very high 
replacement rates in unemployment and sickness pay programs). 
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Source: Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Data Set 
Before concluding this discussion of programmatic outcomes, I want to add a final di-
mension, which is health care. Given that health care and pensions are far and away the 
biggest spending elements of the welfare state, it is a little surprising that much discus-
sion of welfare state retrenchment leaves health care to one side. To some extent this re-
flects a traditional preoccupation of social policy scholars with income replacement. Yet 
as health care expenses have skyrocketed everywhere over the long-term, protection 
against the costs associated with health care has become an increasingly important part of 
basic economic security. Moreover, health care spending in many systems is extremely 
redistributive. Assessing what has happened to the welfare state clearly requires us to 
consider what has happened to health care. 
Perhaps another reason health care often gets sidelined is that assessing change in this 
area is rather tricky, as Richard Freeman and Heinz Rothgang point out in their essay in 
the Oxford Handbook (Freeman and Rothgang 2010). Given inexorable upward pressure 
on health care prices, tracking outlays provides an even more limited perspective than it 
does for other social programs. However, several recent studies that try to capture the 
impact of various reforms on the scale and scope of public health care commitments 
reach consistent conclusions (Hacker, 2004a, Rothgang): it is difficult to find evidence of 
a significant rollback of the health care state. Over the long haul, public coverage has 
generally grown. 
In health care, the evidence reveals signs of what Peter Flora long ago called “growth to 
limits.” As Figure 6 shows, as the era of austerity continues, the public share of health 
care spending first plateaus and then declines, but only very slightly. This suggests that 
there may be some displacement of further growth in health spending towards the private 
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sector – but the shifts are small and constitute a tough basis to build a case for major re-
trenchment around.  
 
How to sum up this initial assessment of what has happened to welfare state programs 
over the very long run? A judgment of what constitutes “major retrenchment” is in the 
eye of the beholder. I offer only my assessment, based on the expectations outlined ear-
lier. As they say in American automobile ads, “your mileage may vary.”  
To me, the evidence suggests a surprising level of stability. Of course, there are signifi-
cant changes over four decades – how could there not be? Yet based on crucial criteria 
like coverage and replacement rates, most welfare state programs in most affluent democ-
racies are close to as generous as they have ever been. Despite the dramatic social trans-
formations and acute fiscal pressures of the past generation, the overwhelming majority 
of major social programs are more generous than they were towards the end of the “Gol-
den Age.” 
Assessing Variation 
Having laid out a lot of evidence about long-term trends, it is finally time to talk about 
variation.6 Remember, much of the analysis of retrenchment has focused on variation 
across programs or countries, but in many ways the central issue is variation over time. I 
hope I’ve made a plausible case that, even after almost four decades, the amount of ob-
                                                 
6  This discussion is limited to variation across programs. In further work I will consider variation 
across countries. 
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served variation in outcomes over time is relatively small – surprisingly small given what 
might have been expected. 
Still, we can of course learn a lot about what is driving the changes that have occurred by 
focusing more precisely on where they occur and where they don’t. It is, in fact pretty 
revealing that the change in replacement rates (while still modest in most cases) is great-
est in sickness and unemployment benefit. As Korpi and Palme would no doubt empha-
size, these are programs that provide benefits to those of working age who would other-
wise be expected to be in the labor market. Thus they are arguably the ones that are most 
likely to erode when the power of unions decline. The particular vulnerability of these 
programs is consistent with the arguments of “power resource” theorists. 
Yet this is also the assessment one would draw from what has come to be called the “new 
politics” approach, which emphasizes how programs can build their own politically pow-
erful constituencies over time. As I noted long ago, unemployment benefits (as well as 
sickness benefits) are unlike most social programs in lacking their own built-in constitu-
ency. While everyone hopes to retire, most don’t hope or necessarily expect to draw un-
employment. And unlike pensioners (Campbell 2003), by the time the unemployed re-
ceive their benefits they are rarely in a chance to mobilize politically.  
The organized base of support for unemployment and sickness benefits rests in unions, 
rather than beneficiaries per se. Thus the fates of these particular programs and these or-
ganizations should be tied, and there is a very plausible link to be drawn between the 
cross-national decline of unions recounted above and the falling generosity of unem-
ployment and sickness benefits. And indeed, it is the case that generosity has fallen rela-
tively far in some of the liberal welfare states where unions are weakest and getting even 
weaker.  
The case is complicated, however, by the fact that replacement rates have also fallen in 
some countries where organized labor has been and remains very strong. In these cases, 
replacement rates remain very high – but not as high as they were before. Reform in these 
contexts often looks more like a case of what I have called “recalibration” – an effort to 
adjust and update welfare state programs rather than an exercise in rolling them back 
(Pierson 2001). In many of these cases, there appears to have been fairly broad consensus 
that extremely high replacement rates were creating costly inefficiencies, and that an ad-
justment in incentives, combined with an expansion of active labor market policies, 
would be beneficial.7 In these cases, replacement rates have remained very high, but not 
as high as they once were. 
                                                 
7  As Huber and Stephens (2001) argue, there has always been something misleading in the applica-
tion of the term “decommodification” to the Social Democratic welfare states, which are character-
ized by an intense focus on keeping people in work or bringing them into work.  
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In looking at variation across programs, we need to consider the other side of the coin – 
something that Korpi and Palme do not do. In particular, we need to look at pensions and 
health care – the two programs that typically make up roughly 80% of welfare state 
spending. Here, there is considerably more evidence of policy durability. Despite relent-
less pressure on the cost side for both programs, and deep concern among policy makers 
and many powerful actors about fiscal sustainability, health care and pension systems 
have generally held up surprisingly well. 
The reason, I think, is evident: these programs are politically powerful. Politicians fear 
the repercussions that would follow from serious efforts to scale them back. Indeed, com-
pared with unemployment and sickness benefit, these programs are the polar opposite in 
terms of their ability to build broad support based on current or potential program receipt. 
To be absolutely clear, this does not mean that these programs are not potentially subject 
to significant change – especially over a period now stretching for nearly four decades. It 
does mean that patterns of development will be strongly influenced by the emergence of 
powerful supportive constituencies. The sensitivity of these constituencies to perceived 
losses of benefits will strongly influence patterns of future development.8 Rolling back 
big, popular social programs is not easy, even where unions decline sharply or intense 
fiscal pressures emerge. In short, both the overall scale of retrenchment and the pattern of 
variation across programs are consistent with a theoretical perspective that emphasizes 
how the development of extensive welfare states has generated new constituencies that 
broaden the base of political support for social programs. 
The Scale of Retrenchment: Some Serious Objections 
Before getting too sanguine about these results, however, there are several serious objec-
tions to be considered, all of which should lead one to be careful in drawing implications 
about the long-term development of social provision. Together, these objections raise two 
critical issues: whether we are sufficiently appreciative of low-visibility, “subterranean” 
shifts in social programs, and whether past trends are a reliable guide to the present and 
future. 
The first objection is that these data on program generosity only include the impact of 
cuts that have already been implemented. It is now well known that one way to make 
potentially unpopular cutbacks more tolerable is to delay their implementation or phase 
them in gradually. Yet the data considered so far do not include cuts that will affect fu-
ture beneficiaries but not present ones. So, for instance, if many of the current British or 
French reductions in benefits had been enacted in 2002 they would not show up in the 
                                                 
8  There are, of course, other features that may contribute to the institutionalization of social provi-
sion as well.  
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data just presented, since these cuts are designed not to go into effect for a number of 
years.  
There is little question that this data limitation creates a bias towards understating down-
ward changes in social programs.9 The problem is probably especially pronounced in 
pension programs, where not only are there tremendous political incentives to delay im-
plementation but the programmatic capacity to do so is the largest. There is good reason 
to expect that as we are able to extend these data sets forward in time we will see more 
evidence of retrenchment, especially in the case of pensions.10 
At the same time, one of the exciting things of now having three decades of data is pre-
cisely the capacity to capture some of these long-term dynamics. The inability to capture 
lagged cutbacks is a limitation that will pose a real problem for those who want to know 
the impact of policy reforms enacted since, say, the late 1990s – especially in the case of 
pensions. It is less of an obstacle for the current goal, which is to capture the long arc of 
social policy development since the early 1970s. 
A second objection concerns the current wave of austerity sweeping across the OECD. 
Many countries are currently experiencing an assault on the welfare state reminiscent of 
the experiences thirty decades ago that triggered so much of the initial interest in welfare 
state retrenchment. Acute financial crises, combined in some cases with the presence of 
right-of-center governments, are clearly producing intense pressures on social programs 
and potentially opening political space for substantial rollbacks. Perhaps the story of the 
three decades from the early 1970s forward, even if accurate, tells us relatively little 
about what is happening now and what to anticipate in the years ahead. Perhaps the real 
era of retrenchment begins now. 
Rather than prognosticating, I would simply suggest that the evidence considered in this 
essay helps us place today’s headlines in a substantially broader context. The OECD 
world is experiencing the most acute economic difficulties since at least the mid-1970s – 
in some countries it is the worst economic climate since the 1930s. Given the structure of 
social expenditure, high unemployment and low or negative growth put intense fiscal 
pressure on welfare states. Countries that reject or are unable to pursue Keynesian re-
sponses will inevitably look to curb public expenditure. Moreover, the urgency of eco-
nomic conditions can sometimes facilitate retrenchment and provide protection against 
blame. As the Iron Lady famously put it, “there is no alternative.” 
Yet even in this context retrenchment is precarious. Political opponents typically have 
incentives to suggest that there are alternatives, and their arguments often resonate. The 
                                                 
9  It is an important example of a broader problem in this area of research – the incentives politicians 
face to lower the visibility of unpopular reforms often make their actions more difficult for re-
searchers, as well as voters, to track. 
10  Scruggs is currently working on extending his data set through the first decade of the 21st century. 
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initial round of social policy cuts in France and the UK, where the conflict has been most 
visible, are revealing. The cuts are serious, but to describe them as frontal assaults on the 
welfare state seems an exaggeration at best. The French reforms will raise the pension 
age for public workers to 62. The British are accelerating, by four years, the implementa-
tion of an already scheduled raise in the eligibility age for public pensions to 66. As many 
analysts have noted, reforms to modestly increase retirement ages still mean that the vast 
majority of increasing longevity has been added to the period of pension receipt rather 
than working life. I find it difficult to see the case for considering these reforms a major 
rollback of social citizenship.  
In the United Kingdom, the proposal to implement an incomes test for Child Benefit is, 
symbolically at least, a bigger shift. The universal status of Child Benefit has long been 
fiercely guarded. Having survived all through the Thatcher/Major years, its revocation 
now represents a historically significant departure. If extended further it could represent 
the kind of “income-testing from the top” strategy that became a distinguishing feature of 
Canadian social policy in the 1990s (Myles and Pierson 1997). Whether this represents 
the kind of snowballing policy change Palier has described in his analysis of France is 
almost impossible to assess ex ante. However, it is crucial to put the current events in a 
broader context, and to recognize that similar suggestions that the end of the welfare state 
is at hand have been around, consistently, since the mid-to-late 1970s. 
The Resilient Welfare State: “Frozen Landscape” or Maginot Line? 
There is a third objection to the argument so far, however, that I find more compelling. 
This is the objection that grants the reality of broad policy stability but questions the im-
plications of that fact. The critics suggest that even surprising policy stability can be con-
sistent with dramatic change in the role the welfare state plays in affluent democracies. 
Indeed, I will argue that this framing gets us closer to thinking clearly about the contem-
porary challenges facing social provision. It is not, as some critics have argued, that the 
claims about resilience are inaccurate; it is that what resilience at the level of major pro-
grams really means only becomes clear when we place it in a broader social and eco-
nomic context. Here, as in other cases of institutional development, one can see a seem-
ing paradox of simultaneous stability and change (Thelen 2004). 
The thrust of this line of argument can be seen in Hacker’s important analysis of what he 
termed “policy drift” (Hacker 2004b).11 Suggesting that reform of the welfare state had 
been understated, Hacker noted that the social role of public policies often depends not 
only on the content of laws but on how those laws interact with changing social and eco-
nomic conditions. In certain policy contexts, the social role of programs may be undercut, 
                                                 
11  The next section of this paper draws in part on ideas developed in joint work with Jacob Hacker 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010a, b and c). 
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even as the rules themselves stay stable, if the rules are not updated to take into account 
changing social and economic realities. The simplest version of this kind of policy drift 
would be a program that was not indexed to inflation. Even as the legal status of the pro-
gram stayed unchanged, the true role of the program would deteriorate over time as 
nominal prices rose. Of course, most social programs are indexed, but other kinds of so-
cial change – shifts in patterns of employment, earnings growth, demographic trends – 
may have similar effects. Where there is “drift”, relative stability in social benefit rules 
may co-exist with dramatic changes in social context -- changes that may undercut or 
endanger the core logic of the welfare state. To understand what is happening we have to 
look not just at the stability of program structures, but at the changing interaction be-
tween program structures and their social and economic contexts. 
There are two ways this focus on the broader context can turn into a serious revision of 
our understanding of retrenchment might take, what might be called a “soft” version and 
a “hard” one. The “soft” version is captured in Esping-Andersen’s evocative notion of a 
“frozen” welfare state landscape. In this depiction, “old” risks (say, those built around the 
male-breadwinner model) crowd out “new” risks (such as those associated with single 
parenthood or precarious employment). Already occupying scarce fiscal space and pro-
tected by powerful networks of beneficiaries, established programs have a tremendous 
political advantage over potential competitors. In this context, as Esping-Andersen has 
argued, governments will typically under-invest in combating these new risks. In Esping-
Andersen’s view the problem is not that existing social programs are too vulnerable to 
retrenchment. The problem is that they are too resilient. The result of the resilience of 
established social programs is that welfare states are likely to be increasingly maladapted 
to the contours of gradually changing societies.  
There is indeed significant evidence to support this view. Julia Lynch’s important study 
of why some welfare states have a much more pronounced age-bias than others is built 
largely around this kind of mechanism (Lynch 2006). It is less about states having con-
sciously chosen to set and renew these kinds of priorities than it is about the difficulty of 
altering broad programmatic commitments once they are established. As Lynch puts it, 
“[t]he unintended consequences of institutional rigidities undoubtedly play a larger role 
in structuring welfare state outcomes than much of the previous literature has allowed” 
(Lynch 2006, p. 193). 
Guliano Bonoli (2007) has developed a distinct but related argument. He presents sugges-
tive evidence that the timing of “post-industrial” transitions has had a durable effect on 
responses to new social risks. Countries that made this post-industrial transition earlier – 
before core welfare state commitments had fully matured and absorbed available fiscal 
space – have been more responsive to these new risks. Bonoli argues that the countries 
that made the transition later have not just been laggards. Rather, they have been durably 
affected, as the fiscal resources needed to address some of these challenges have been 
pre-committed to “old” welfare state risks. 
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These arguments fit well with a lively recent discussion in political science focused on 
how to study institutional change (Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). As Kathleen Thelen and I have stressed in different ways, 
we need to think of stability and change as constituting two sides of the same coin. Un-
derstanding the “glue” that holds institutions together helps us to understand the course 
of institutional change. Thus the fact that there are severe difficulties in rolling back 
deeply institutionalized social programs should not be taken to imply that “nothing is 
happening.” Rather, the presence of well-established programs creates distinctive oppor-
tunity structures and constraints. Extensive patterns of commitments channel social pol-
icy development along particular lines. This doesn’t mean the absence of change, or even 
the absence of significant reforms of institutionalized programs. It does mean that those 
programs themselves have become critical features of the political landscape. Reformers 
do not face a tabula rasa.12 
Esping-Andersen and others have, understandably, viewed this “frozen landscape” di-
mension of contemporary social policy with considerable frustration. Modern welfare 
states, even generous ones, abound with inequities related to age, gender and other di-
mensions, many of them rooted in accidents of timing.13 There are new challenges, new 
sources of economic and social deprivation, new obstacles to the welfare state’s long-
standing ambitions of enhancing the capacity of individuals to live happy and productive 
lives, freed from intense economic insecurity. Why should some policies and beneficiar-
ies receive priority simply because they got their claims in first? Some of the freshest and 
most compelling recent work on the welfare state (Bonoli 2007, Hausermann 2010) has 
explored the implications of this “frozen landscape” for social policy reform. Yet this is 
the critical point: it is precisely the resilient nature of the welfare state that produces these 
particular dynamics of reform. 
Given the seriousness of potential social “mismatches” between resilient programs and 
emerging needs, why do I refer to this “frozen landscape” view as the “soft” take on how 
to situate welfare state resilience within a broader context? Because it looks positively 
Panglossian compared with a second, “hard” view. This second critical take on welfare 
state resilience might be called the “Maginot Line” version. It is not just a matter of the 
welfare state being insufficiently nimble and thus insufficiently responsive to emerging 
social challenges. Instead, the “Maginot Line” claim would explore a more radical possi-
bility: programmatically-resilient welfare states run the risk not of being over-run by their 
opponents but of being outflanked. The stability of those social programs, however real, 
                                                 
12  For an innovative discussion of how pension reform efforts can be channeled by program struc-
tures see Weaver (2010). 
13  As a fairly recent migrant to the state of California I am tempted to call this the “Proposition 13 
Effect”, since due to the wisdom of California voters a resident’s property tax can vary by an order 
of magnitude based simply of the timing of their home purchase. Long-term residents receive 
hugely preferential treatment compared with recent arrivals.  
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is consistent with an account in which opponents of a politics that generates a relatively 
broad distribution of economic rewards and opportunities for social mobility advance on 
other fronts. Rather than launching frontal assaults on popular programs, opponents of 
modern welfare states would go around them. 
Hacker (2004) applied this argument to the distinctive public/private policy mix in 
American social policy. The structure of social provision in the United States, which 
leans heavily on benefits subsidized by public policy but provided voluntarily through 
employers, is vulnerable (perhaps uniquely so) to processes of policy drift. Changes in 
employment patterns and employer practices have led to declines in the coverage and 
generosity of these public/private aspects of social provision, even in the absence of sig-
nificant reforms in the public rules themselves. Moreover, and crucially, changing policy 
through drift advantages those with the most resources. Because these changes take place 
incrementally and in the absence of high profile public conflicts, ordinary citizens are 
often unaware of the trends or their relationship to the decisions (or non-decisions) of 
public officials. 
Hacker and I have recently applied this argument as part of a much broader effort to un-
derstand how the American political economy has been transformed over the past genera-
tion to become much more “winner-take-all” (Hacker and Pierson 2010b, 2010c). Over 
the past thirty years the United States has seen an extraordinary concentration of eco-
nomic rewards at the top of the income distribution. Fully 40% of income growth has 
gone to the top 1% of the income distribution, and the majority of that has gone to the top 
.1%. In short, the United States has become a “winner-take-all” economy.14  
Many analysts have attributed rising inequality to apolitical processes associated with 
globalization and technological change. Yet the changes have been much greater in some 
countries than others, and greater in the United States than just about anywhere else (see 
Figure 7), and the acute concentration of gains is actually inconsistent with these inter-
pretations. This variation across the world of affluent democracies suggests that a dra-
matic upward shift in income distribution is not simply the playing out of some sort of 
“natural” economic process. In the United States, we document the pervasive role of both 
policy drift and policy enactments in areas as diverse as industrial relations policy, taxa-
tion, financial deregulation, and corporate governance. 
                                                 
14  I note in passing that this is a development that raises all sorts of interesting puzzles for students of 
political economy, since the classic Meltzer/Richards model concerning the reaction of the median 
voter to rising inequality suggests that what the United States has experienced shouldn’t occur. See 
for instance Torben Iversen’s discussion in his contribution to the Oxford Handbook. 
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Figure 7: The Top 1% in Affluent Democracies 
 
Scholars of the welfare state may note an irony in the theoretical analysis we offer. Our 
argument draws on “institutionalist” traditions in that it emphasizes how the structure of 
political institutions, along with inherited policy structures, influences the contours of 
contestation. Yet it explains the broad transformation over time in outcomes through a 
claim about the sharp shift in organized power resources in American society. The shift 
to winner-take-all politics reflected a decisive alteration in the conditions of “organized 
combat” in Washington. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s American employers organized much more intensively and 
effectively. Clinging to an industrial relations system designed in the 1930s and shut out 
of power in Washington, unions, especially in the private sector, went into near-terminal 
decline. Just as Korpi would anticipate, this shift in the balance of organized power was 
in turn “reflected in movements on the left-right continuum of the set of feasible alterna-
tives around which political conflict is centered at a particular time.” Both major political 
parties moved to the right on economic issues (although the Republican Party moved 
much further, so the space between the two parties widened over time). Tailoring tax, 
financial, industrial relations and corporate governance policies to the needs of the eco-
nomically privileged, Washington largely abandoned the middle class. 
Crucially for the current discussion, all of this was compatible with remarkable durability 
of the core programs of the American welfare state, including Social Security and Medi-
care. Well-protected and widely popular, the welfare state did not really erode. Business 
and its conservative allies learned that such frontal assaults were neither wise nor neces-
sary. Stability of (formal) welfare state programs was compatible with massive (substan-
tive) change in the distribution of economic rewards. 
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As we emphasize, this is a distinctively American story. The extent to which these dy-
namics are at work in other countries is a crucial research agenda. The point here is that 
we need to think carefully, and critically, about the true implications of the striking wel-
fare state resilience that I believe characterizes the long era of austerity. Esping-Andersen 
once said that no one fought over social spending levels per se. We need to add: they 
didn’t, and don’t, fight over programs per se. The true struggle – the one analysts need to 
keep their eyes on, even as the locations of those struggles shift over time – is over how 
societies that combine democratic politics and market economies distribute economic and 
social risks and rewards. 
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